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The Code and the Constitution: Fifth
Amendment Limits on the Debtor's
Discharge in Bankruptcy
Nicholas A. Franke*
INTRODUCTION
While most debtors invoke the bankruptcy process to obtain for-
giveness or discharge' of their indebtedness, the power of the court
to grant a discharge is not without limitation. The Supreme Court
and several courts of appeal have identified a constitutional limita-
tion on bankruptcy discharge not found in the Bankruptcy Code.2
The decisions of these courts have established that the fifth amend-
ment3 limits discharge and requires the debtor to provide adequate
notice to creditors before extinguishing their claims.
To correctly define the due process limitation on bankruptcy dis-
charge, individual and nonindividual debtors4 as well as each type of
* Associate, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Los Angeles, California; J.D., Washing-
ton University School of Law, 1988. The author limits his practice to bankruptcy and
insolvency matters. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of the firm or its clients.
1. "Discharge" is a bankruptcy term of art that generally refers to the extin-
guishment of debts or claims against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141 (1988).
2. Id. §§ 101-1330. "Bankruptcy Code" refers to The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, amended by the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 33, further amended by The
Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)).
Some cases cited in this article were decided under the predecessor of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The enactment of the Code has not dis-
turbed the rationale of the cases decided under the Act for purposes of this article, but
if a change in law has affected the validity of any decision cited herein, that effect will
be disclosed when appropriate. All references herein are to the Bankruptcy Code, as
amended, unless specifically stated otherwise.
3. The fifth amendment states in pertinent part: "No person shall ... be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ..... U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
4. Any person "that resides or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in
bankruptcy proceeding 5 must be separately considered. This article
primarily discusses the due process limitation on a nonindividual
debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization.6 Although materials involving
individual debtors and different chapters of the Bankruptcy Code are
referenced when helpful to the analysis, those subjects are beyond
the scope of this treatment.
Section II of this article briefly outlines the discharge concept and
the limitations placed on it by the Bankruptcy Code. Section III
highlights relevant case law prior to and after the identification of a
due process limitation on discharge. Section IV outlines the conflicts
between the case law and the Bankruptcy Code on discharge. Section
V defines the type of notice necessary to satisfy the due process re-
quirements of discharge. Finally, Section VI suggests methods to pro-
tect a debtor from exceptions to its discharge caused by
constitutionally inadequate notice to creditors.
II. DISCHARGE AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A bankruptcy case commences upon the filing of a petition.7 In a
Chapter 11 case, the debtor then generally compiles and seeks credi-
tor acceptance of a plan of reorganization.8 When the debtor obtains
the creditors' acceptance of the plan and the approval of the court,
the plan is "confirmed." 9
Several consequences flow from confirmation of a plan of reorgani-
zation,10 including the discharge of the debtor's debts. Section 1141 of
the Bankruptcy Code states, in part: "Except as otherwise provided
in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan,
the confirmation of a plan-(A) discharges the debtor from any debt
the United States, or a municipality" may be a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code,
subject to very narrow exclusions. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1989). "'[P]erson' includes individ-
ual, partnership and corporation, but does not include governmental unit .... Id.
§ 101(35).
5. The Bankruptcy Code generally provides for five types of proceedings. The
law applicable to each type of proceeding is set forth in individually numbered chap-
ters: Chapter 7 applies to liquidation cases; Chapter 9 to proceedings for municipalities;
Chapter 11 to reorganizations; Chapter 12 to family farm reorganization; and Chapter
13 to individual debt adjustment cases. Section 109 specifies debtor eligibility require-
ments for relief under each of the five chapters. Id. § 109.
6. See i& §§ 1101-1174.
7. IM § 301.
8. A plan of reorganization designates the manner in which the claims of credi-
tors will be paid and what disposition will be made of the debtor's property. For most
of the provisions dealing with the plan process, see id. §§ 1121-1129.
9. Id §§ 1128, 1129 (bearing on confirmation of plan).
10. Id. § 1141. Confirmation of a plan binds the debtor and all creditors to its
terms, revests all property of the bankruptcy estate in the debtor, frees all property of
the bankruptcy estate from liens and equity interests, and enjoins actions against the
debtor based on preconfirmation obligations. See also i& § 524.
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that arose before the date of such confirmation ....
By its terms, section 1141 discharges all preconfirmation debts,
whether or not a proof of claim12 is filed or deemed filed, i3 whether
or not the claim is allowed,14 and whether or not the creditor has ac-
cepted the plan of reorganization.' 5 Section 1141 contains only four
express exceptions to its broad grant of discharge. These exceptions
are discussed below.
A. Exceptions to Discharge at Confirmation
Two of the four exceptions to the Chapter 11 discharge contained
in section 1141 occur during the confirmation process. Confirmation
of a plan of reorganization does not extinguish any debt excluded
from discharge in the plan or the order confirming the plan.'6 A
plan, therefore, can except claims from discharge, and the court can
make exceptions to discharge when it confirms a plan of
11. Id. § 1141(d)(1)(A). A Chapter 7 debtor receives a discharge of all claims "that
arose before the date of the order for relief." Id, § 727(b). An order for relief in a vol-
untary case occurs on the date the petition commencing the case is filed. Id. § 301. Ad-
ditionally, subject to limited exceptions, a Chapter 13 debtor is discharged from all
debts "provided for" by the plan. I& § 1328(a).
A discharge under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 will not discharge the ten types of debts spec-
ified in section 523(a) if the debtor is an individual. See id. § 523(a) (exceptions to dis-
charge). However, creditors must pursue certain exceptions to the debtor's discharge,
or the exception is waived. See id. § 523(a)(2), (4), (6), (c).
12. A proof of claim is a document filed with the bankruptcy court by a creditor to
notify both the court and the debtor that the creditor asserts a claim against the
debtor. See id. § 501. Unless the debtor has included the creditor and its claim in the
debtor's schedules filed with the court at the commencement of the case, and the
debtor does not dispute the claim, a creditor must file a proof of claim to receive pay-
ment on its claim in a Chapter 11 case. BANKR. R. 3003.
13. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, a creditor may file a timely proof of claim at any
time prior to the bar date. The bar date is a specific date set by the court, usually at
the request of the debtor, by which all proofs of claim must be filed to be considered
timely and to receive payment in the case. In a Chapter 7 case, proofs of claim must be
filed within 90 days of the first meeting of creditors. BANKR. R. 3002(c).
In a Chapter 11 case, a proof of claim is deemed filed if the debtor includes the claim
in its schedules and does not designate the claim as disputed, unliquidated, or contin-
gent. Id, § 3003(b)(1). In a Chapter 7 case, because the debtor's schedules are for in-
formational purposes only, a creditor must file a claim to participate in the
distribution. Id. § 3002(a).
14. A claim is deemed allowed unless an objection to the claim is made, or the
debtor has scheduled the claim as disputed, contingent or unliquidated. 11 U.S.C. § 502
(1988). A "claim" includes a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced
to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured .... Id. § 101(4).
15. Id. § 1126 (acceptance of plan).
16. Id. § 1141(d)(2).
reorganization.17
B. Exceptions to the Discharge of an Individual Debtor
Section 1141 incorporates the ten bases for excepting a claim's
from an individual's discharge found in section 523 into the chapter
11 scheme.19 Those exceptions to discharge apply only to individual
debtors and do not apply in any bankruptcy case in which the debtor
is not an individual.20
Only one of the ten bases for excepting a claim from discharge pro-
tects the creditor who has no knowledge of the bankruptcy case. 21
This exception generally provides that the creditor's claim will not be
discharged if the debtor does not list a creditor in the debtor's bank-
ruptcy petition and schedules22 in time for the creditor to file a
timely proof of claim.2 3 However, the exception also has an excep-
tion. If the creditor had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case
17. Id.; see also id. § 524(d); BANKR. R. 4008.
18. See supra note 14.
19. Section 523(a) generally excepts from discharge claims based upon certain tax
obligations, alimony and child support, claims made in prior bankruptcies, certain edu-
cational loans and claims based on the debtor's fraud or misconduct. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a) (1988).
Although § 1141(d)(2) incorporates § 523, thereby making a Chapter 11 discharge
subject to the ten types of claims excepted from discharge by § 523(a), the incorpora-
tion is unnecessary. The provisions of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 apply in Chapter 7, 11, 12,
and 13 proceedings, with only limited exceptions in railroad reorganizations. Id.
§ 103(a).
20. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Shadco, Inc., 762 F.2d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 1985) (dis-
charge exceptions for willful and malicious injuries do not apply to corporate debtors);
see also Beard v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1987).
21. Section 523 reads, in pertinent part:
A discharge under section 727, [sic] 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt...
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title, with the
name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, in time to permit-
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6)
of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such
creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for
such timely filing; or
(B) if such debt is of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4) or (6) of
this subsection, timely filing of a proof of claim and timely re-
quest for a determination of dischargeabiity of such debt under
one of such paragraphs, unless such creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
22. "The debtor shall-(1) file a list of creditors, and unless the court orders
otherwise, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and current
expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial affairs .... " Id. § 521(1).
Upon motion by the United States Trustee, the court may convert to Chapter 7 or
dismiss a Chapter 11 proceeding if the debtor fails to file the schedules required by
section 521(1). Id. § 1112(e); see also id. § 707(a)(3).
23. See supra note 13.
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early enough to file a timely proof of claim,24 that creditor's claim
will be discharged regardless of whether the debtor listed the credi-
tor in the schedules.25
C. Liquidating Plan Exception to Discharge
The final section 1141 exception to discharge26 differs from the pre-
vious three in that it denies discharge completely; the other three ex-
ceptions only eliminate the discharge as to one debt. Thus, this
exception is commonly referred to as a "global" denial of discharge,
while the other exceptions often are referred to as "rifle-shot" excep-
tions to discharge.
For a Chapter 11 discharge to be globally denied pursuant to sec-
tion 1141(d)(3), notwithstanding the confirmation of a plan, the plan
must provide for the liquidation of the debtor,2 7 the debtor must not
engage in business after the plan, and the debtor must be ineligible
for a discharge in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case. 28 This subsection
generally denies discharge to nonindividual debtors that confirm
plans providing for the liquidation of most of their assets, and indi-
24. A proof of claim is timely in a Chapter 11 proceeding if filed prior to the bar
date for filing claims set by the court. See id However, a question remains as to how
long before the bar date a creditor must receive actual knowledge of the case to have
knowledge "in time" to file a timely proof of claim pursuant to § 523(a)(3). Consider
the case of a creditor who obtains actual knowledge of the case the day before the bar
date and waits two days to file a proof of claim.
25. The author doubts the constitutionality of the actual knowledge exception to
the § 523(a)(3) exception to discharge, and discusses his rationale later in this
treatment.
26. Section 1141(d)(3) states:
The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if-
(A) the plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the
property of the estate;
(B) the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the
plan; and
(C) the debtor would be denied a discharge under section 727(a) of this
title if the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (1988).
27. To satisfy this element of § 1141(d)(3), the plan must provide for the liquida-
tion "of all or substantially all of the property of the estate." Id, § 1141(d)(3)(A).
"Property of the estate" is a phrase of art in the Bankruptcy Code that generally re-
fers to all property interests of the debtor at the commencement of the case, in addi-
tion to certain interests acquired after the case commences. See id § 541.
28. This element considers whether the debtor could obtain a discharge if it were
a Chapter 7 debtor. See i& § 727(a) (grounds for denial of discharge in Chapter 7).
The first of the ten grounds for denial of discharge in a Chapter 7 case applies when
the debtor is not an individual. I& § 727(a)(1).
vidual debtors that liquidate and have committed wrongful acts or
have received a discharge within the preceding six years.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF DISCHARGE IN THE COMMON LAW
A. Cases Prior to 1953
Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code describes the debtor's dis-
charge in terms very similar to the corollary provision of the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898.29 Both sections provide for nearly unlimited
discharge of all preconfirmation debts. Neither the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 nor the current Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to give
notice of the proceeding to a creditor as a condition to discharge of
that creditor's claim.3O
During the fifty years following the enactment of the Bankruptcy
Act, courts literally applied the discharge provision3l and discharged
the claims of creditors that did not receive official notice of the bank-
ruptcy case. Evans v. Dearborn Machinery Movers3 2 illustrates the
literal application of the discharge provision. In Evans, the debtor
did not schedule a certain creditor and that creditor received no no-
tice from the court of the bankruptcy proceeding. The debtor con-
firmed a plan, but the creditor did not participate in the confirmation
process. After confirmation, the creditor brought an action against
the debtor on its claim. Although the creditor had actual knowledge
of the bankruptcy, the court held that the creditor's claim would
have been discharged even if he had not known of the case, and even
though the debtor did not schedule the creditor. In affirming the in-
junction against the continuation of the creditor's action against the
debtor, the court stated its holding served "to secure and preserve for
[the debtor] the fruits and advantages of [the confirmation] decree,
and to stay the state court proceedings which interfered with (the
bankruptcy court's) exclusive jurisdiction and violated its prior ex-
press orders."33
29. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 550; see supra note 2.
30. Section 523(a)(3) is the only section of the Bankruptcy Code that conditions a
debtor's discharge on any type of notice to or knowledge by a creditor. However, § 523
only applies when the debtor is an individual, and allows the discharge of a creditor's
claim when the creditor has actual knowledge of the case in time to file a timely proof
of claim. See supra note 21. Thus, under the terms of the Bankruptcy Code, a claim
can be discharged without notice by the debtor to a creditor if that creditor has actual
knowledge of the case early enough to file a timely proof of claim.
Similarly, although the Bankruptcy Rules require notice of certain events in the
bankruptcy case, they do not condition a debtor's discharge on providing adequate no-
tice to creditors. See BANKR. R. 2002 (notice of bar date and confirmation hearing); id.
§ 3017(d) (notice of confirmation hearing).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
32. 200 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1953).
33. Id. at 128.
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The Evans court failed to consider whether the creditor had re-
ceived notice of the bankruptcy, and focused instead on the fact that
the debtor had received a discharge. Virtually all courts prior to 1953
followed the Evans rationale3 4 and read the discharge provision
literally.3 5
B. New York Railroad and Due Process
In 1953, the Supreme Court held in City of New York v. New York,
New Haven & Hartford Railroad 36 that the due process protection of
the fifth amendment 37 entitled a creditor to adequate notice before
its claim could be discharged. Although the Court previously had
held that the fifth amendment limited the bankruptcy clause,3 8 it
had not used due process to create a judicial or constitutional excep-
tion to a debtor's discharge.
The New York Railroad case involved the attempted enforcement
of public improvement liens claimed by the City of New York against
the real property of a reorganized railroad.39 The railroad obtained a
bar date for filing claims4O and mailed notice of that date to volun-
tary mortgage trustees, their counsel, and creditors who had ap-
peared in the proceedings. The railroad also published notice of the
bar date on two separate occasions in five newspapers of general cir-
34. See North Am. Car Corp. v. Peerless Weighing & Vending Mach. Corp., 143
F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1944).
35. Although the Evans case was decided under the Bankruptcy Act, the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Code are substantially similar. See
supra note 29.
36. 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953).
37. See supra note 3.
38. The "bankruptcy clause" refers to the fourth clause of article I, § 8, of the
United States Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power "[t]o es-
tablish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
Numerous decisions have recognized the fifth amendment limitation on the bank-
ruptcy clause. See, e.g., Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938); Louis-
ville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); In re Phillips, 13 Bankr.
82 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981).
39. While special provisions apply to railroad reorganizations, those provisions do
not impact directly the constitutional issue of adequate notice. Section 77(c)(8) of the
Bankruptcy Act, applicable in the New York Railroad case, required "reasonable no-
tice of the period in which claims may be filed." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(c)(8), repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV,
§ 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978). For notice requirements of the bar date and confirmation
hearing under current law, see 11 U.S.C. § 1128 (1988); BANKR. R. 2002, 3017. Chapter
11 contains the Bankruptcy Code provisions concerning railroad reorganizations. See
11 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1174 (1988).
40. See supra note 13.
culation.41 Although the City had actual knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding, it did not receive official notice of the bar date
and did not file a claim in the case. The court freed the railroad
properties from the City's liens in its reorganization order. When the
City attempted to enforce the liens after the reorganization, the dis-
trict court enjoined the enforcement, which the appellate court sub-
sequently affirmed.42
The Supreme Court reversed,43 holding that the City was entitled
to official notice of the bar date and the reorganization proceedings
before its liens could be extinguished.44 After recognizing the inferi-
ority of constructive notice by publication to notice by mail, the
Court held that when a debtor knows of the existence of a creditor,
constructive notice does not satisfy due process and the creditor's
claim cannot be discharged.45
The Court further rejected the railroad's argument that the City's
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding rendered mailed no-
tice to the City unnecessary. The Court distinguished knowledge of
the reorganization proceeding in general from knowledge of an order
setting a bar date for filing claims, and stated that a creditor with
knowledge of the proceeding did not have a duty to investigate
whether a bar date had been set, but could wait for notice of the bar
date order from the debtor.46 The Court therefore held that actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy alone did not provide the due process
41. The notice was published once a week for two weeks in the Wall Street Jour-
nal and four other daily newspapers located in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode
Island. City of New York, 344 U.S. at 294 n.2.
42. Id. at 295.
43. I& at 297.
44. The Court based its decision on the finding that the notice employed by the
railroad was not "reasonable," as required by section 77(c)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Although the Court did not predicate its holding expressly on due process grounds, it
did cite its seminal due process case. Id. at 296 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). Further, the Court defined "reasonable" in
language similar to the standard used in procedural due process cases. "The statutory
command for notice (Section 77(c)(8)) embodies a basic principle of justice-that a rea-
sonable opportunity to be heard must precede judicial denial of a party's claimed
rights." Id at 297.
45. The Court found notice by publication to be appropriate only in certain cir-
cumstances, none of which was present in the case before it. "[W]hen the names, in-
terests and addresses of persons are unknown, plain necessity may cause a resort to
publication." Id. at 296 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. 306).
46. Because a creditor would continually need to inquire whether a bar date for
filing claims had been set in a reorganization case, the Supreme Court held that a cred-
itor's actual knowledge of the case in general was not adequate notice, but that the
creditor, was entitled to official notice of the bar date.
The Court's rationale, however, does not apply equally in a Chapter 7 case. In such
a case, timely claims must be filed within 90 days of the first date set for the meeting
of creditors. See supra note 13. The meeting of creditors must be held between 20 and
40 days after the commencement of the case. BANKR. R. 2003(a). Therefore, a creditor
with actual knowledge of a Chapter 7 case does not have to inquire about a bar date.
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required to discharge a creditor's claim.47
C. The Progeny of New York Railroad
No less than four federal circuit courts of appeal have published
decisions following New York Railroad.48 Although many courts
have recognized the due process limitation on discharge, courts have
cited In re Harbor Tank Storage49 and In re Intaco Puerto Rico5o
most frequently after New York Railroad.
Harbor Tank Storage and Intaco Puerto Rico contain very similar
facts. In each case, the creditors knew of the debtor's bankruptcy
and the bankruptcy trustees knew that the creditors held claims
against the debtors. The trustees published notice of the bar date
and the date of the hearing to consider plan confirmation. In Harbor
Tank Storage, the creditor read the published notice of the confirma-
tion hearing. Neither creditor received mailed notice of the bar date
or confirmation hearing. Both courts allowed the creditors to file
late claims.
The most important part of both the Harbor Tank Storage and In-
taco Puerto Rico decisions is the willingness of the courts of appeal to
extend the Supreme Court's holding in New York Railroad to protect
the claims of general, unsecured creditors. New York Railroad re-
quired a debtor to satisfy due process requirements before a secured
creditor's lien on the debtor's property could be avoided.5 ' Harbor
Tank Storage and Intaco Puerto Rico required the same type of no-
Rather, the creditor can mathematically calculate when the deadline for filing timely
claims is based upon the date the case was commenced.
Similarly, courts consistently have held that actual notice of the bankruptcy is suffi-
cient notice of the deadline for filing dischargeability complaints because the deadline
is a statutorily fixed number of days after the commencement of the case. See Neeley
v. Murchison, 815 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1987); In re Rhodes, 61 Bankr. 626, 629
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986); In re Walker, 91 Bankr. 968, 978-80 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988); cf. In
re Alton, 837 F.2d 457, 460 (11th Cir. 1988) (requiring official notice of the deadline
"before [the creditor] is under a duty to make inquiries" would conflict with the actual
knowledge exception of section 523(a)(3)). But see In re Ricketts, 80 Bankr. 495, 498
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (Jones, B.J., concurring in the result) (actual knowledge of
bankruptcy proceeding not sufficient notice of deadline for filing complaint).
47. New York Railroad, 344 U.S. at 297.
48. See, e.g., Broomall Indus. v. Data Design Logic Sys., 786 F.2d 401, 405 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Const. Co. (In re Reliable Elec. Co.), 726 F.2d 620
(10th Cir. 1984); see also infra notes 49-50.
49. 385 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967).
50. 494 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1974).
51. The Bankruptcy Code generally refers to secured debt as an interest in prop-
erty, and unsecured debt as a claim. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 506 (1988).
tice to be given to known, unsecured creditors before the discharge of
their claims. Other courts have cited and applied this extension of
the New York Railroad holding without substantial question. 52
IV. RECONCILING THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND
NEw YORK RAILROAD
Although enacted approximately twenty-five years after publica-
tion of the Supreme Court's decision, the Bankruptcy Code does not
incorporate the due process principle enunciated in New York Rail-
road.53 The Bankruptcy Code's requirements of notice to creditors
and the statutory consequence of insufficient notice fall significantly
short of the exception to discharge that resulted from constitution-
ally inadequate notice to the City of New York.54
A. Discharge of an Individual
Neither New York Railroad nor any subsequently reported case
facing the issue has found the type of debtor relevant in determining
the notice constitutionally required to discharge a creditor's claim.
The Bankruptcy Code sets forth different consequences when inade-
quate notice is given to creditors and the debtor is an individual, and
when inadequate notice is given and the debtor is not an individual.55
The Bankruptcy Code provides for the discharge of all precon-
firmation claims in a Chapter 11 case upon confirmation of a plan of
reorganization.56 However, section 1141 expressly excepts the catego-
ries of claims listed in section 523 from discharge if the debtor is an
individual.57 Section 523(a)(3) generally excepts a claim from dis-
charge if the creditor does not receive notice or have actual knowl-
edge of the case in time to file a timely proof of claim.58 The
Bankruptcy Code contains no corollary exception when the debtor is
not an individual.
Because section 523 applies only to individual debtors, the Code im-
plies that nonindividual debtors receive a discharge of all precon-
firmation claims when a plan is confirmed regardless of the notice
given to creditors. New York Railroad and its progeny make this im-
52. See supra note 48.
53. See supra note 30.
54. The only sanction found in the Bankruptcy Code for inadequate notice to cred-
itors applies only when the debtor is an individual and the creditor does not have ac-
tual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1988); see also
supra note 30. Bankruptcy Rules 2002 and 3017 require notice to creditors, but do not
provide a penalty for inadequate notice. See BANKR. R. 2002, 3017.
55. See supra notes 20-21, 30.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
57. I& § 1141(d)(2).
58. See supra note 21.
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plication constitutionally impermissible. However, some courts have
strictly applied the terms of the Bankruptcy Code and discharged
claims without notice to creditors notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's holding to the contrary.5 9
B. Discharge Based on Actual Notice
As previously stated, when the debtor is an individual, section
523(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code generally excepts from discharge
the claims of creditors who do not receive notice of the case soon
enough to file a timely proof of claim.6 0 However, regardless of the
notice given to the creditor, the claim would be discharged pursuant
to section 525 if the creditor had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy
case in time to file a claim.
Although section 523(a)(3) codifies the main precept of New York
Railroad,6 ' the statute adds the "actual knowledge" exception6 2
which was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court. The creditors
in New York Railroad, Harbor Tank Storage, and Intaco Puerto Rico
all had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case, yet their claims
were not discharged because they did not receive official notice of
either the bar date for filing claims or the confirmation hearing. The
Supreme Court held that a creditor can wait for official notice of
these dates even if that creditor has actual knowledge of the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.63 Therefore, the "actual knowledge" exception
contained in section 523(a)(3) violates the due process requirements
of the fifth amendment when applied in a Chapter 11 case in which
the debtor knows of the existence of a creditor and that creditor's
claim.64
59. See, e.g., Nebraska Security Bank v. Sanitary and Improvement Dist. No. 7, 119
Bankr. 193 (1990); In re International Resorts, Inc., 74 Bankr. 428 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1987); In re Safeguard Co., 35 Bankr. 44 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); In re Torres, 15
Bankr. 794 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186,
192 (9th Cir. 1965) ("The filing of a bankruptcy petition has long been regarded as a
caveat to all the world.") (emphasis in original), rev'd, 385 U.S. 99 (1966); In re Bowen,
89 Bankr. 800, 805 (Bankr. Minn. 1988) ("[Section 523(a)(3)] is not intended as a safe
haven for creditors with actual knowledge of a pending bankruptcy case who neglect
to promptly evaluate and advance their interests in the case.").
60. See supra note 30.
61. New York Railroad, 344 U.S. at 297 (claims of creditors without adequate no-
tice cannot be discharged).
62. See supra note 21.
63. New York Railroad, 344 U.S. at 297.
64. While the author believes actual knowledge of the case should be sufficient to
satisfy due process when the debtor does not know and has no reason to know of a
creditor, this position is not reflected either in the case law.
C. Discharge Without Notice
With the sole exception of section 523(a)(3), the Bankruptcy Code
does not require notice to a creditor as a prerequisite to discharge of
that creditor's claim. Section 1141, which applies to Chapter 11 cases,
provides for a discharge of all preconfirmation debts upon confirma-
tion.65 Because section 523(a)(3) requires notice to creditors before
discharging their claims only when the debtor is an individual, and
because no corollary provision exists when the debtor is not an indi-
vidual, the Bankruptcy Code apparently takes the position that
claims can be discharged without notice to the claimholder when the
debtor is not an individual.
Even though the debtor in New York Railroad was not an individ-
ual, no logical basis exists for the application of its holding solely to
cases in which the debtor is not an individual. The due process re-
quired by New York Railroad protects creditors. Therefore, the type
of debtor should be irrelevant to the notice a creditor should receive.
Creditors in all bankruptcy cases must be given official notice of the
relevant dates in the case, as required by New York Railroad and its
progeny. 66
D. Reconciling the Code and the Cases
As discussed above, the discharge described by the Bankruptcy
Code violates the fifth amendment standard set by the Supreme
Court in New York Railroad. To be constitutionally permissible, the
discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code must be read subject to
the New York Railroad holding.67
The limitation section 523(a)(3) imposes on the discharge of an in-
dividual debtor cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny for two rea-
sons. First, because section 523 applies only to individual debtor
cases,68 it wrongfully implies that the fifth amendment requires no
notice to creditors in nonindividual debtor cases.69 A constitutional
65. See supra note 11.
66. See supra notes 48-50.
67. To pass constitutional muster, grant of the discharge must be subject to the
fifth amendment requirement of adequate notice. Both the "actual knowledge" caveat
to the section 523(a)(3) discharge exception and that exception's application solely to
individual debtor cases would also have to be eliminated. See supra note 30.
68. See supra note 20.
69. The language of the fifth amendment does not exclude individuals from its ap-
plication. In fact, the amendment states: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
No rational reason exists to require official notice to creditors when the debtor is not
an individual without requiring the same notice when the debtor is an individual. No-
tice is for the benefit of creditors, not debtors, and creditors are entitled to adequate
notice irrespective of the type of debtor. See generally City of N.Y. v. New York, N.H.
& H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953); In re Adams, 734 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1984); In re
Moseley, 74 Bankr. 791 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
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reading of section 523(a)(3) must include its application to cases in
which the debtor is not an individual, contrary to that section's lan-
guage. Second, section 523(a)(3) fails to satisfy fifth amendment re-
quirements because it allows the discharge of claims when a creditor
has actual knowledge of the case despite inadequate official notice of
the relevant dates in the case. Discharge without notice to creditors
contradicts the Supreme Court's holding that the fifth amendment
requires formal notice before a claim can be discharged in bank-
ruptcy.70 Thus, section 523(a)(3) cannot be reconciled with New York
Railroad and is unconstitutional. 71
V. DETERMINING WHAT PROCESS IS DUE
The notice required by the fifth amendment before a creditor's
rights are adversely affected cannot be rigidly defined because it
often depends upon the circumstances. 72 In probably the most fre-
quently cited decision on the subject, the Supreme Court recognized
the different types of notice and the appropriateness of each type in
certain situations.73 The notice to creditors required before discharge
may differ depending on certain factors. Generally, courts have de-
scribed the type of notice satisfying due process requirements as "no-
tice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."74 Even though static rules
on the type of notice required invite danger, general principles can be
found in the applicable case law.
A. When Creditors Should Receive Notice
Before determining how notice should be given, it must be deter-
mined which events in the case must be noticed to creditors prior to a
discharge of their claims. The two critical events requiring notice to
creditors before claims can be discharged are the bar date for filing
claims,75  and the hearing on confirmation of the plan of
70. New York Railroad, 344 U.S. at 296.
71. See supra note 67.
72. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 797 (1982); New York Rail-
road, 344 U.S. at 296.
73. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950).
74. Id. at 314 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Grannis v. Ordean,
234 U.S. 385, 392-98 (1914); Priest v. Board of Trustees of Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604, 615
(1914); Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409-13 (1900)).
75. Kay v. Hogan (In re Gulfco Investment Corp.), 593 F.2d 933, 934 (10th Cir.
1979); In re American Properties, Inc., 30 Bankr. 247, 251 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
reorganization.76
In most cases, notice of the bar date for filing claims may be the
only notice necessary to discharge a creditor's claim. If the creditor
has been notified of the bar date, has not been scheduled by the
debtor and fails to file a proof of claim, that creditor will not have an
allowed claim in the case.77 A creditor without an allowed claim has
no right to vote on a plan of reorganization and will not receive pay-
ment on its debt.
The importance of the bar date and the timely filing of a proof of
claim are shown best by example. In Chicago, Rock Island and Pa-
cific Railroad,78 a minor was injured on the debtor railroad.79 The
debtor mailed the minor's mother a claim form that contained the
bar date, but neither the minor nor his mother filed a claim and the
railroad received its discharge. The minor, upon reaching majority,
sued to recover damages for his injuries. The court enjoined the ac-
tion against the railroad holding the claim discharged,so although the
minor had not received any compensation in the reorganization for
his injuries.
Under certain circumstances, notice of the confirmation hearing
may be the most critical notice given to a creditor. As described
above, if the creditor has not been scheduled and has not filed a claim
in the case after notice of the bar date, notice to that creditor of the
confirmation hearing may be surplusage and unnecessary.8 1 How-
ever, creditors with allowed claims in the case must be given notice
of the confirmation hearing.
In one case, a subcontractor withdrew from a construction project,
filed a Chapter 11 petition, and did not schedule the general contrac-
tor as a creditor.8 2 The general contractor sued the debtor in state
court for breach of contract. The action was removed to bankruptcy
court, and the debtor counterclaimed against the general contractor.
The general contractor prevailed in the action and the debtor filed a
proof of claim on the general contractor's behalf. The debtor then
76. Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Const. Co. (In re Reliable Elec. Co.), 726 F.2d 620,
623 (10th Cir. 1984); In re General Oil Distrib., 68 Bankr. 603, 604 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1986).
77. If the debtor has scheduled the claim as contingent, unliquidated, or disputed,
the claimholder must file a proof of claim to have an allowed claim and be treated as a
creditor in the case. BANKR. R. 3003(c)(2); see also supra note 14. All creditors must
file a proof of claim in a Chapter 7 proceeding. BANKR. R. 3002(a).
78. In re Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 788 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1986).
79. See supra note 39.
80. Chicago RR., 788 F.2d at 1283.
81. A creditor that does not file a proof of claim, or that is not scheduled by the
debtor in a Chapter 11 case other than as contingent, disputed or unliquidated, does
not have a claim in the case. BANKR. R. 3003; see supra note 14; ini&ra note 135.
82. Reliable Elec. Co. V. Olson Const. Co. (In re Reliable Elec. Co.), 726 F.2d 620
(10th Cir. 1984).
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sought to have the general contractor bound by its previously con-
firmed plan of reorganization and to have the claim declared dis-
charged. In denying discharge of the claim, the court held that
although the general contractor had a claim in the case, it had not
received adequate notice of the confirmation hearing and was not
given an opportunity to be heard.83
Notice of the bar date must be given to all creditors to provide
them with the opportunity to file a timely proof of claim.84 If the
creditor does not file a proof of claim prior to the confirmation hear-
ing, the debtor may not be required to give notice of the confirmation
hearing to that creditor.8 5 However, the cautious debtor will give no-
tice of both the bar date and the confirmation hearing to all parties
to best protect its discharge.86
Once a creditor has an allowed claim in the case, either through in-
clusion in the debtor's schedules or by filing a proof of claim, the
debtor must give that creditor notice of the confirmation hearing in
time for the creditor to have an opportunity to be heard.87 Although
other notices to creditors may be necessary in the case, the bar date
and confirmation hearing have the greatest impact on the debtor's
discharge.
B. Known Creditors
The most important factor in defining adequate notice of either the
bar date or the confirmation hearing is the debtor's knowledge of the
creditor's existence. Courts consistently have held that when the
debtor knows of an entity's claim, the debtor must give notice of the
83. Id. at 622.
84. Even creditors scheduled by a Chapter 11 debtor must be given notice of the
bar date because a proof of claim filed by a creditor supersedes the scheduling of its
claim. BANKR. R. 3003(c)(4). A creditor must be given the opportunity to file a claim
of a type or in an amount different than that scheduled by the debtor.
85. Arguably, creditors attempting to file claims after the bar date may not be en-
titled to notice of the confirmation hearing because they are not entitled to vote or to
receive distributions on their claims. See id. 3003(c)(2). Presumably, the only
claimholders the debtor will know of that do not file proofs of claims are claimholders
scheduled by the debtor. A claimholder scheduled as contingent, disputed, or unliqui-
dated that does not file a proof of claim may not be entitled to notice of the confirma-
tion hearing. See also id. 2002(h); supra note 135.
86. The better practice is to give notice of the confirmation hearing to all credi-
tors, regardless of whether they have filed proofs of claim or how they are scheduled.
By providing notice to all creditors, the debtor may avoid a constitutional challenge to
the notice given.
87. In re Nevada Emergency Serv., 39 Bankr. 859, 863 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1984).
relevant dates to that creditor.88 "Claim" for these purposes must be
defined broadly.89 The term includes contingent claims and claims
that are not ripe. In order to receive the most inclusive discharge
possible, a debtor that knows of a possible claim against it should give
the creditor notice of the relevant dates.
In a 1984 case, the debtor asserted a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff in an action that had been removed to the bankruptcy court.90
Because the debtor believed it would prevail on its counterclaim and
defeat the plaintiff's action, it did not schedule the plaintiff as a cred-
itor or give the plaintiff notice of the confirmation hearing. When
the plaintiff received judgment in its favor, the debtor filed a proof of
claim on the plaintiff's behalf. The court held that the plaintiff's
claim was not discharged because it did not receive notice of the con-
firmation hearing.91 If the debtor had given the plaintiff notice of
the confirmation hearing, the claim could have been discharged.92
Therefore, all potential claimants against a debtor should be given
notice of both the bar date and confirmation hearing to ensure dis-
charge of all claims.
Constructive notice to a known clairnholder is insufficient to dis-
charge its claim.93 In New York Railroad, the City of New York had
recorded liens on certain parcels of real property owned by the
debtor railroad. Although the debtor gave mailed notice to consen-
sual real property mortgagees, it relied on notice published in certain
newspapers to inform the City of the reorganization and its effect on
the City's rights. Finding that the City's liens were not avoided in
the reorganization, the Court determined that the identity and ad-
dress of the City appeared in the real property records and was easily
ascertainable by the debtor. Thus, the Court held that constructive
notice by publication did not provide adequate notice to the City
under the fifth amendment.94
C. Unknown Creditors
Because of the expansive definition given to the term "claim" in
88. See City of N.Y. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); In re Intaco
Puerto Rico, 494 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1975); In re Harbor Tank Storage, 385 F.2d 111 (3d
Cir. 1967) (published notice to known creditor not adequate, even though creditor read
published notice).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988); see also supra note 14.
90. Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Const. Co. (In re Reliable Elec. Co.), 726 F.2d 620
(10th Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 622.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (1988).
93. City of N.Y. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); see also In re
Harbor Tank Storage, 385 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1967).
94. New York Railroad, 344 U.S. at 297.
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the Bankruptcy Code,95 persons not known to the debtor may have
claims in the case. Unless these creditors receive notice of either the
bar date or the confirmation hearing, their claims will survive the
bankruptcy to haunt the debtor and interfere with its fresh start.9
To receive a complete discharge, the debtor must provide notice of
the relevant dates to all creditors.
A debtor obviously cannot schedule or give notice to a creditor it
does not know exists. Courts have weighed the tension between the
difficulty of giving unknown creditors adequate notice of the bank-
ruptcy and the policy favoring discharge of all claims against the
debtor.97 In several cases, courts have held claims not known to the
debtor to be discharged if the debtor published, or gave "constructive
notice," of the relevant dates to creditors.98
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused
to allow a creditor to file a late claim, despite the fact that no reor-
ganization plan had been confirmed, because notice of the bar date
had been published.99 In that case, the creditor was not aware of the
bankruptcy, and the trustee did not know of the creditor's existence.
The court found publication to be sufficient notice to the creditor of
the bar date and, therefore, refused to allow the late filing of the
claim.
Conversely, claims have survived discharge when published notice
was not given. Subsequent to confirmation, a creditor in one case
commenced a state court action against the debtor on a pre-petition
debt. The debtor did not know about the claim. Until its state court
action was removed by the debtor to the bankruptcy court, the credi-
tor did not know about the bankruptcy. On the debtor's motion to
dismiss the state court action, the court noted the need for published
notice in certain circumstances, held the creditor's claim was not dis-
charged, and denied the debtor's motion to dismiss.100
95. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988); see also supra note 14.
96. See Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Const. Co. (In re Reliable Elec. Co.), 726 F.2d
620 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Intaco Puerto Rico, 494 F.2d 94 (1st Cir. 1974).
97. See generally In re Remington Rand Corp., 836 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1988).
98. In re Chicago Pac. Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Production
Plating, 90 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); see also New York Railroad, 344 U.S.
at 296 ("When the names, interests and addresses of persons are unknown, plain neces-
sity may cause a resort to publication."); Broomall Indus. v. Data Design Logic Sys.,
786 F.2d 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
99. In re Gulfco Inv. Corp., 593 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1979).
100. Reliable Electric, 726 F.2d at 620.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company,101 the
Supreme Court recognized that personal service or mailed notice
might be too burdensome in certain situations, and that due process
does not always require actual notice. Courts have allowed notice by
publication to discernible creditors if mailed notice would be too bur-
densome. The Eleventh Circuit limited mailed notice to a certain
number of creditors, and found published notice to the remaining
creditors adequate.102 The court set a bar date and required notice of
that date to be mailed to approximately 280,000 potential claimants
and interest holders. Additionally, the court required notice of the
bar date to be published twice in fifty-three newspapers world-
wide.103 Past debentureholders who did not receive mailed notice of
the bar date filed late claims and the trustee objected. In finding due
process satisfied by the notice given, the appellate court stated that
mailed notice to past debentureholders of the debtor in addition to
the 280,000 other parties given mailed notice would have been too
burdensome and costly, and thus was not required by the fifth
amendment. Accordingly, the court sustained the trustee's objections
to the late claims.04
D. Discharge Based on Actual Notice
A creditor's knowledge of the bankruptcy does not affect the notice
to which the creditor is entitled 0 5 and is irrelevant to the due pro-
cess inquiry when the debtor is not an individual. In Broomall Indus-
tries v. Data Design Logic Systems,10 6 a creditor commenced suit
against a discharged debtor for patent infringement. The district
court granted the debtor's motion for summary judgment based on its
defense of discharge in bankruptcy. On appeal, the court found that
the creditor knew about the bankruptcy but chose not to participate
in it. However, the debtor did not know about the creditor and did
not give the creditor notice of the relevant dates in the case. On
these facts the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the
debtor, stating that the creditor's actual notice of the bankruptcy did
not obviate the need for formal notice to the creditor of relevant
101. 339 U.S. 306, 313-18 (1950) (notice by publication sufficient if location and iden-
tity of creditor are unknown).
102. In re GAC Corp., 681 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. Notice was published in 53 newspapers worldwide, including the Wall Street
Journal and The New York Times. C. City of N.Y. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 344
U.S. 293, 294 (1953) (requiring railroad to mail notice to mortgage trustees and all cred-
itors who had appeared in court, and to publish notice in only five newspapers, includ-
ing the Wall Street Journal).
104. GAC Corp., 681 F.2d at 1300.
105. New York Railroad, 344 U.S. at 297.
106. 786 F.2d 401 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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dates in the case.107
In re Production Platingl08 demonstrates the risk a creditor with
knowledge of the bankruptcy takes by not informing the debtor of
her claim or participating in the case. In this case, the debtor did not
know about, and thus did not schedule, a wrongful death claimant.
However, the debtor published notice of the case. Approximately
two months before confirmation, the creditor learned of the bank-
ruptcy during the deposition of an officer of the debtor. After confir-
mation, the creditor amended her complaint to add the debtor as a
defendant in the wrongful death action. The court found the pub-
lished notice sufficient and granted the debtor's motion to dismiss
based on the recently received discharge in bankruptcy.
If the debtor is an individual, the Bankruptcy Code provides for
discharge of the claims of creditors that obtain actual knowledge of
the case in time to file a timely proof of claim. 0 9 Section 523 speci-
fies ten exceptions to discharge, applicable only when the debtor is
an individual. One of those exceptions, section 523(a)(3), provides
that when a creditor is not scheduled by the debtor its claim is not
discharged "unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of
the case in time for such timely filing"11o of a proof of claim. At least
one published appellate decision has recognized this principle."'
It is difficult to determine whether the Bankruptcy Code intended
to discharge the claims of creditors with actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy in all cases, or whether it intended to provide for the dis-
charge of those claims only when the debtor is an individual. If the
discharge of creditors with actual notice is intended to apply in all
cases, the inclusion of this language in section 523, which applies only
to individual bankruptcy, can only be attributed to a drafting error.
The strongest argument that the Bankruptcy Code intended to dis-
charge the claims of creditors with actual knowledge only in individ-
ual cases is the placement of that provision in section 523. That
section applies only to cases filed by individuals. Expression of one
thing is exclusion of all others.112 Therefore, because the Bank-
ruptcy Code states that claims of creditors with actual knowledge are
107. Id at 405.
108. 90 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1988).
110. Id; see supra note 21.
111. See In re Adams, 734 F.2d 1094, 1098 (5th Cir. 1984).
112. This common law maxim is more traditionally expressed as "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius."
discharged when the debtor is an individual, n 3 and it is silent on the
issue when the debtor is not an individual, the negative implication is
that the provision was consciously omitted in nonindividual cases.
The better rule requires formal notice to creditors before discharg-
ing their claims, without considering the creditor's actual knowledge
or the type of debtor,1n4 when the debtor knew or should have
known of the creditor's claim. The debtor has a duty to schedulei"5
and give notice to creditors of the relevant dates in the bank-
ruptcy.n 6 Even when a creditor knows a bankruptcy has been com-
menced, it does not necessarily know when the relevant dates are
set,"17 unless it stays in frequent contact with the debtor or its attor-
ney or constantly reviews the court's docket. This burden of investi-
gation should not be placed on the creditor that is involuntarily
drawn into the bankruptcy process. The burden should be on the
party seeking relief, the debtor, to accurately and completely sched-
ule its creditors and to give the required notices to all parties entitled
to receive them.18 Section 523(a)(3) should be disregarded to the ex-
tent it discharges the claim of a creditor with actual knowledge of the
bankruptcy, but without official notice of the relevant dates, when
the debtor knew or should have known of the existence of a claim.1i 9
The application of section 523(a)(3) achieves the proper result
when the debtor does not know of the claim against it and has no
reason to know of the claim. The debtor cannot be expected to
schedule and give mailed notice to creditors it has no reason to be-
113. The Bankruptcy Code actually only provides for the discharge of the claims of
creditors that have actual knowledge of the case in time to file a timely proof of claim.
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (1988).
114. Section 523(a), which provides for the discharge of claims whose holders have
actual knowledge of the case, applies only in cases in which the debtor is an individual.
See id § 523(a); see also supra note 21.
115. The Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to file a schedule of its creditors.
See supra note 22. Inclusion in the debtor's schedules increases a creditor's chances of
receiving official notice of relevant dates in the case because most notice lists will be
compiled at least in part from the schedules. The schedules will be an important
source for a creditor that gives notice to parties interested in the action. See generally
BANKR. R. 2002.
116. See BANKR. R. 2002, 3017(d).
117. The term "relevant dates" is used throughout herein to refer to the bar date
and the date of the confirmation hearing. These dates are "relevant" because most
courts focusing on the due process and discharge issue find notice of these dates to be
the most constitutionally significant. See supra note 13; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1128;
BANKR. R. 2002(f), 3017(d). See generally In re Production Plating, 90 Bankr. 277
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988) (published notice of commencement of the case sufficient to
discharge unknown claims). But see City of N.Y, v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 344
U.S. 293, 297 (1953).
118. Section 521(1) places an affirmative duty on the debtor to file a schedule of its
creditors. The United States Trustee can seek dismissal or conversion of the case for
the debtor's failure to comply with this reporting requirement. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1)
(1988); see supra note 22.
119. See supra notes 64 and 69.
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lieve hold claims against it. The burden of inquiry is properly placed
on the creditor with actual knowledge of the case when the debtor
has no reason to know of the creditor.'20 The important goal of
granting the debtor a discharge of all claims against it requires un-
known creditors with actual knowledge of the case to make their
claims in the bankruptcy.121 The failure of such creditors to partici-
pate in the case will result in the discharge of their claims without
payment if the debtor gives notice by publication of the relevant
dates.122
Although the debtor's knowledge of a creditor's claim should de-
termine whether the creditor's actual knowledge of the bankruptcy
affects the dischargeability of the creditor's claim, the type of debtor
involved remains irrelevant to the inquiry.123 The purpose of requir-
ing notice to creditors before the discharge of their claims is to pro-
tect creditors. A creditor with a claim against an individual debtor is
not entitled to any less notice of the relevant dates in that bank-
ruptcy than the same creditor with a claim against a debtor corpora-
tion or partnership. Discharge has the same effect on the creditor in
both cases. 124 Therefore, the applicability of section 523(a)(3) solely
to cases of individual debtors should be disregarded.
E. Future Tort Claimants
"Future tort claimants" describes persons injured by an object or
circumstance when the injuries will not be detectable for a substan-
tial period of time.125 The impossibility of identifying all future tort
claimants poses the practical problem of how to notify these claim-
120. Although this approach seems to conflict with the holding in New York Rail-
road that a creditor with actual knowledge has no duty of inquiry, in that case the
creditor was listed in the official real property records of the debtor's domicile, its
identity was easily ascertainable, and the debtor possibly knew of the creditor's claim.
When the debtor has no reason to know of a claim, and the creditor has actual knowl-
edge of the case, constructive notice by publication seems unnecessary to satisfy due
process. "Notice by publication is a poor and sometimes a hopeless substitute for ac-
tual service of notice. Its justification is difficult at best." New York Railroad, 344 U.S.
at 296 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). See
generally Production Plating, 90 Bankr. at 277 (claim of unknown creditor with actual
knowledge of case discharged after constructive notice).
121. In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985).
122. See Broomall Indus. v. Data Design Logic Sys., 786 F.2d 401, 404 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Production Plating, 90 Bankr. at 277; see also supra note 120.
123. Contra 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1988). See supra note 30.
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988).
125. See Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1043 (claimants exposed to asbestos but had not yet
developed symptoms).
ants of the relevant dates in the bankruptcy of the alleged tortfeasor.
In many circumstances, future tort claimants will be creditors who
are unknown to the debtor and who are unaware that they have
claims against the debtor.26 Courts have found notice by publication
to satisfy due process requirements when a creditor's claim is not
known to the debtor.127 However, the due process standard fash-
ioned in Mullane creates a special difficulty with respect to these
claimants. Will notice by publication "apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action,"12 8 even if a future tort claimant reads
the published notice? The future tort claimant may read the pub-
lished notice and not realize she has a claim against the debtor be-
cause her injury has not been detected.
The converse consideration must be the discharge and fresh start
of the debtor. A debtor's most significant and troublesome debt may
be liability to future tort claimants. 129 Because their claims against
the debtor may become known to future tort claimants over a long
period of time, discharge will never free the debtor of this financial
burden unless it applies to all existing future tort claimants, regard-
less of when their claims become known.130
VI. PROTECTING THE DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE
Enough certainty exists in the Bankruptcy Code and reported deci-
sions to determine what notice should be given to a creditor to obtain
a discharge of its claim. Attorneys representing debtors must be cog-
nizant of these rules and decisions in order to achieve the fresh start
their clients seek when entering the reorganization arena.
The debtor's schedules'31 provide the first opportunity for an error
or omission to result in the exception of a claim from discharge.
Most service lists for providing notice of the relevant dates in the
case will be compiled from the schedules. A debtor should err on the
126. For a case deciding whether a future tort claimant is a creditor in a bank-
ruptcy and thus bound by the discharge, see In re Pettibone Corp., 90 Bankr. 918
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988); Moreau, Who Are Creditors in a Reorganization Proceeding?,
26 WASH. U.L.Q. 27 (1940).
127. City of N.Y. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953); In re Produc-
tion Plating, 90 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
128. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
129. Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1043; American Serv. Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525, 529
(4th Cir. 1941), quoted in Beard v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir. 1987).
130. The author seeks only to point out the due process issue that exists with re-
spect to future tort claimants, and does not express an opinion on the correct rule or
result. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this article, and such decisions are bet-
ter left to legislators. See generally Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1043, n.9; Rowe, Bankruptcy
and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984); Comment, The Case of the Disappearing
Defendant, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 145 (1983); Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating
Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1983).
131. See supra note 22.
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side of overinclusion of creditors when compiling its schedules. Obvi-
ously, known creditors should be scheduled, but the debtor also
should consider scheduling persons who might become creditors dur-
ing the case and those who allege claims that the debtor believes
have no merit.132 Additionally, the debtor should amend its sched-
ules during the case to include all claimants discovered after the com-
mencement of the case or mistakenly omitted from the original
schedules.3
Notice of the relevant dates'34 in the case is the most critical step
of the reorganization for protecting the discharge of a debtor who
seeks to confirm a plan of reorganization. Great care should be taken
to mail notice of the relevant dates to all creditors, even if their
claims are contingent, disputed, or unliquidated, to avoid future due
process defenses to the discharge. 3 5
The debtor must decide whether the case warrants notice of the
relevant dates by publication. The facts of each case will determine
132. Claims can be scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated in the
debtor's schedules, and will not be treated as claims unless the creditor files a proof of
claim. See supra note 13. Thus, the debtor can schedule a disputed creditor's claim,
and give the creditor official notice of the proceedings to protect the debtor's discharge
from a constitutional challenge, without admitting the validity of the claim. See
BANKR. R. 3003(c)(2).
133. The schedules in a voluntary case can be amended by the debtor at any time
before the case is closed. BANKR. R. 1009. Further, a debtor can file a proof of claim
on a creditor's behalf, subject to certain time restrictions. Id. § 3004. An amendment
to the schedules has an advantage over filing a proof of claim on a creditor's behalf
because the claim can be listed as contingent, disputed, or unliquidated in the sched-
ules. See supra note 132. If a claim is made through a proof of claim, it is allowed
unless an objection is made. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
An amendment to the schedules also is advisable when a debtor's name or address is
listed incorrectly. See In re Adams, 734 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1984) (claim not discharged
because notice sent to wrong address).
134. See supra note 117.
135. A creditor scheduled as contingent, disputed, or unliquidated, that does not file
a proof of claim, cannot vote on the plan, and may not be entitled to notice of the con-
firmation hearing. However, any "party in interest" may object to the plan's confirma-
tion. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b) (1988). A creditor is a party in interest. Id § 1109(b). The
Bankruptcy Cede defines "creditor" broadly, and does not require a person to have a
valid claim in the estate in order to be a creditor. Id § 101(9). Further, Bankruptcy
Rule 3017(d) requires that notice of the confirmation hearing be given to all creditors,
even though that rule expressly recognizes that certain creditors may not be entitled
to vote on the plan. BANKR. R. 3017(d). When a person complains of a lack of due
process, "it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would
have led to the same result." Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915).
For these reasons, the cautious debtor will give notice of the confirmation hearing to
all creditors, including those listed as contingent, disputed, or unliquidated that do not
file proofs of claim.
whether notice of these dates should be published. 36 The debtor
should consider the possibility of unknown claims against it, the pos-
sible size of any such claims, the cost of publishing the notice, and
the effect published notice of its bankruptcy will have on its business.
For instance, a wholesaler with a limited number of employees that
does business with an easily identifiable group of other businesses
may be able to identify all of its creditors and thus avoid published
notice. However, the owner of a fleet of taxi cabs that may have
been involved in accidents not reported to the debtor, or a retail store
that trades with the public at large, might discharge unknown claims
by publishing notice. Publication of the relevant dates provides a
debtor with the best protection against unknown creditors who may
later assert preconfirmation claims against the debtor that could have
been discharged in the bankruptcy.
If a debtor decides to give notice by publication, it must then decide
how frequently to publish the notice, what the notice should contain,
and where to publish it. Notice by publication should conform to the
principle that it be "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity
to present their objections." 37 The debtor first should look to the
bankruptcy court for guidance as to how often and where the notice
should be published.138 A court order specifying the type of pub-
lished notice that is adequate, given the circumstances of the case,
provides the debtor with its first line of defense to a future attack by
an unknown creditor to the sufficiency of the published notice.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code defines the discharge in a reorganization
proceeding expansively, providing for a discharge of all preconfirma-
tion obligations of the debtor, subject to ten narrow exceptions. The
Supreme Court and numerous decisions by lower courts have held
that the United States Constitution limits the Bankruptcy Code dis-
charge language and requires notice of certain bankruptcy events to a
creditor before its claim can be discharged.
The Bankruptcy Code excepts unscheduled claims from discharge
when the debtor is an individual, unless the claimholder has actual
136. See supra note 127.
137. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
138. "The court may order notice by publication if it finds that notice by mail is
impracticable or that it is desirable to supplement the notice." BANKR. R. 2002(k).
"Whenever these rules require or authorize service or notice by publication, the
court shall, to the extent not otherwise specified in these rules, determine the form
and manner thereof, including the newspaper or other medium to be used and the
number of publications." Id. 9008.
For examples of published notice ordered by the courts, see supra notes 41, 103.
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knowledge of the bankruptcy case. The problem with this exception
is twofold: (1) if the exception is valid, it should apply equally in
those cases in which the debtor is not an individual; and (2) courts
have held that actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case does not ob-
viate the due process requirement of official notice to the creditor of
relevant events in the case prior to discharge.
Therefore, debtors must give adequate notice of relevant events in
the case, such as the bar date for filing claims and the date set for the
confirmation hearing, to all creditors as a prerequisite to discharging
their claims. Creditors not known to the debtor can be given ade-
quate notice of the relevant events in the case through published no-
tice. Thus, a debtor must give notice by publication to ensure the
discharge of all preconfirmation claims against it.

